{"version":1,"id":"crypto-bunker-mode","title":"Crypto Bunker Mode","summary":"Crypto Bunker Mode is a proposed defensive practice of migrating crypto assets to fresh addresses whose public keys have never been exposed to reduce risk if ECDSA is broken by AI- or quantum-powered attacks.","content":"A **crypto bunker** (or **bunker mode**) is a defensive custody practice, proposed by [Ethereum Foundation](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum-foundation-ef) researcher [Justin Drake](https://iq.wiki/wiki/justin-drake), in which [cryptocurrency](https://iq.wiki/wiki/cryptocurrency) holders move the bulk of their assets into fresh [blockchain](https://iq.wiki/wiki/blockchain) addresses that have never signed a transaction and whose [public keys](https://iq.wiki/wiki/public-key) therefore remain hidden on-chain behind a cryptographic hash. Drake introduced the term on October 7, 2026, in a post on X, calling on the blockchain industry to \"calmly begin planning for 'bunker mode'\" as a precaution against the possibility that artificial intelligence could discover a mathematical shortcut capable of breaking the elliptic-curve cryptography that secures [Bitcoin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitcoin) and Ethereum wallets.[\\[1\\]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) The proposal is framed as a preventative \"band-aid\" rather than a response to any demonstrated attack, and Drake has repeatedly urged holders not to panic or rush, warning that a botched migration could cause greater losses than the risk it is meant to mitigate.[\\[2\\]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b)​\n\nDrake's post drew millions of views and prompted responses from across the industry, including Ethereum co-founder [Vitalik Buterin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/vitalik-buterin), who endorsed taking the underlying risk seriously while cautioning against hasty action.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​\n\n## Background and Origin\n\n​[Justin Drake](https://iq.wiki/wiki/justin-drake), a senior researcher at the [Ethereum Foundation](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum-foundation-ef), had spent months warning publicly about a cybersecurity threat posed by quantum computing before escalating his rhetoric in October 2026 to encompass artificial intelligence.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d) His earlier focus had been on \"Q-day,\" the hypothetical point at which quantum computers become powerful enough to break the public-key cryptography in widespread use today.[\\[4\\]](#cite-id-670a5quehr) In March 2026 Drake co-authored a Google Quantum AI paper suggesting that breaking the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) could be achieved with roughly 1,200 logical qubits, which the paper described as a twenty-fold reduction in the previously understood physical hardware requirements for that capability.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d) In June 2026 he forecast Q-day as \"10% by 2030\" and \"50% by 2032.\"[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​\n\nThe bunker-mode proposal marked a shift in that framing. Rather than waiting for large fault-tolerant quantum machines, Drake began arguing that a sufficiently capable AI could uncover a classical algorithm—one that runs on ordinary computers such as a large cluster of graphics processing units (GPUs)—that would sharply reduce the difficulty of recovering a private key from its corresponding [public key](https://iq.wiki/wiki/public-key).[\\[5\\]](#cite-id-uyp0jxv53y) In his view this challenges the industry's long-standing assumption that quantum computing must be the first technology capable of breaking these systems, and it changes the timetable the industry should plan against.[\\[5\\]](#cite-id-uyp0jxv53y)​\n\nIn his October 7 post, Drake defined an ECDSA \"break\" for the purposes of his scenario as the ability to recover a private key quickly—for example, within about one week using available hardware such as a large GPU cluster—and he stated it is \"now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years.\"[\\[6\\]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) He stressed that this is a worst-case, \"left-tail\" outcome he wanted the industry to consider rather than a demonstrated capability.[\\[2\\]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b)​\n\n## How It Works\n\nBunker mode is built on a distinction in how [blockchain](https://iq.wiki/wiki/blockchain) wallets expose their cryptographic material. A wallet uses a secret number called a private key to authorize payments, while a related [public key](https://iq.wiki/wiki/public-key) allows the network to verify that a transaction's signature is valid. Generating a public key from a private key is computationally easy, but recovering the private key from the public key is designed to require an impractical amount of computing work.[\\[1\\]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Both [Bitcoin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitcoin) and [Ethereum](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum) rely on ECDSA—Ethereum's standard externally owned accounts use it on the secp256k1 curve—to confirm that a transaction was approved by the correct private-key holder.[\\[5\\]](#cite-id-uyp0jxv53y)​\n\nThe key insight is that a public key becomes visible on-chain only after an address signs its first transaction. Until then, an address that has merely received funds exposes only a hash of its public key, leaving the raw public key itself hidden.[\\[6\\]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) A \"bunker\" wallet is therefore a wallet that has never signed a transaction. If ECDSA were broken, only addresses with exposed public keys would be at immediate risk; an attacker targeting a bunkered wallet would first need to reverse the public-key hash and only then attack the private key, making such wallets harder targets in the first wave of attacks.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d) Drake has characterized the proposal as essentially the existing best practice of never reusing addresses—a principle [Satoshi Nakamoto](https://iq.wiki/wiki/satoshi-nakamoto) articulated in October 2008, writing that \"A new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner.\"[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​\n\n### Operational Guidance\n\nDrake's operational advice is that large, sophisticated holders should move the bulk of their funds to never-signed addresses and keep them there like deep cold storage, transacting only in emergencies.[\\[2\\]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b) When such an address must send funds, the exit transaction should be accompanied immediately by a full sweep of any remaining balance into another new, never-transacted wallet—ideally within the same [block](https://iq.wiki/wiki/block)—so that the exposed address is never left holding value.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d) The replacement wallet can be generated from the same [seed phrase](https://iq.wiki/wiki/seed-phrase).[\\[6\\]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) Drake has emphasized that this requires no new cryptography or new wallets and describes it as a \"simple, preventative step,\" while repeatedly warning that a rushed migration could do more harm than good.[\\[6\\]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)​\n\nFor infrastructure that signs messages repeatedly—examples Drake cited include price oracles and layer-2 security councils—he recommended rotating ECDSA [public keys](https://iq.wiki/wiki/public-key) with every signed message and/or adding a hash-based signature scheme such as SPHINCS as a backup.[\\[7\\]](#cite-id-jwz9tlzii5) He acknowledged that there is no durable exit from these precautions under current systems: \"Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography,\" a form of cryptography that does not yet exist in the consensus layer of networks such as [Bitcoin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitcoin).[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​\n\n### Named Custodians and \"Satoshi's Shield\"\n\nDrake urged the largest entities to lead by example and named four categories of major custodians specifically: [Changpeng Zhao](https://iq.wiki/wiki/changpeng-zhao)'s [Binance](https://iq.wiki/wiki/binance), [Vlad Tenev](https://iq.wiki/wiki/vlad-tenev)'s Robinhood, Babak Zanjani's [Bitbank](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitbank), and [Giancarlo Devasini](https://iq.wiki/wiki/giancarlo-devasini)'s [Bitfinex](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitfinex) and T[ether](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ether-eth), calling on them to harden their cold storage and to place key management and controlled address migration at the center of their near-term response.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​[\\[8\\]](#cite-id-rpt543o1hn) To help holders assess their exposure, he pointed to Project Eleven's [Bitcoin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitcoin) \"risq list,\" a public tracker of Bitcoin addresses that hold funds and have exposed [public keys](https://iq.wiki/wiki/public-key), which according to [The Block](https://iq.wiki/wiki/the-block) covers more than 14 million addresses.[\\[4\\]](#cite-id-670a5quehr)​\n\nDrake also argued that smaller holders enjoy some natural protection, describing what he called \"Satoshi's shield\": roughly 20,000 exposed addresses linked to Bitcoin's creator, each holding 50 BTC, which he suggested a rational attacker would target before moving on to smaller wallets, giving wallets holding under 50 BTC partial cover.[\\[4\\]](#cite-id-670a5quehr) He cited [Satoshi Nakamoto](https://iq.wiki/wiki/satoshi-nakamoto)'s large and highly public wallets as among the likely initial targets of a rational AI- or quantum-powered attacker.[\\[3\\]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d)​\n\n## The AI-Driven Cryptographic Threat\n\nThe immediate catalyst for Drake's post was OpenAI's October 6, 2026, publication of 722 mathematical results, produced by an unreleased internal frontier model, in a GitHub repository, along with formalizations of many of the proofs in computer-checkable Lean form.[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b) The model had been tested on approximately 4,000 research problems and failed to solve most of them, and OpenAI said some findings had computer-checkable proofs while others remained unverified and could contain errors.[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b)[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Each result used on average computing power equal to roughly three hours of ChatGPT Pro reasoning, and OpenAI said the model had solved the Navier–Stokes problem.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Within a day, an outside researcher reran the computer check on one result—a new limit on how fast computers can multiply large grids of numbers—and found it held.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Drake interpreted the release as a sign that \"mathematical superintelligence is upon us.\"[[4]](#cite-id-670a5quehr) Multiple outlets, including [CoinMarketCap](https://iq.wiki/wiki/coinmarketcap), noted that OpenAI's release does not reference cryptography, elliptic curves, or ECDSA, and that Drake's conclusion of a near-term risk to signature security is his own extrapolation rather than a claim made by OpenAI.[[7]](#cite-id-jwz9tlzii5)\n\nDrake's technical argument is that elliptic curves carry a rich algebraic structure—he pointed to concepts such as Schoof's algorithm, the Frobenius endomorphism, and pairings—that he believes makes them \"especially vulnerable to superintelligence,\" whereas hash functions are deliberately designed to minimize such structure.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) He cited recent surprising mathematical developments—the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication, progress on the 3SUM conjecture, and the May 2026 disproof by an OpenAI model of the Erdős unit distance conjecture—as examples of long-held assumptions falling faster than expected and of human mathematical intuition being humbled.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)[[7]](#cite-id-jwz9tlzii5) Invoking the researcher Ewin Tang as an example that an efficient quantum algorithm can foreshadow an efficient classical one, he urged openness to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor's algorithm that could break elliptic curves and RSA simultaneously, and he questioned whether 64-byte ECDSA signatures were \"too good to be true.\"[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)[[5]](#cite-id-uyp0jxv53y) Drake further stated that he has witnessed US government censorship of academic quantum cryptanalysis results and described \"backroom interventionism\" as his base case for why cryptographic breakthroughs may be under-represented among OpenAI's publications, though CoinMarketCap noted he did not cite a specific recent instance.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)[[7]](#cite-id-jwz9tlzii5)\n\nReporting on the proposal placed it against a backdrop of documented AI-assisted security incidents, while stressing that no practical attack on [Bitcoin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/bitcoin) or [Ethereum](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum) wallet keys has been demonstrated and none appeared in the research reviewed.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) In December 2025, Anthropic researchers showed that frontier models could write working exploits against simulated copies of real DeFi contracts.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) In late July 2026, a volunteer group called the Bitcoin Red Team used AI models to sweep 390 Bitcoin software projects in about 27 hours, logging nearly 5,000 possible flaws, 85 of them rated critical.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) On July 30, 2026, an attacker began draining Coldcard [hardware wallets](https://iq.wiki/wiki/hardware-wallet) through a five-year-old firmware bug, taking at least 1,367 BTC, and Coldcard maker Coinkite said it suspected AI helped find the flaw; days later BTCPay Server confirmed that attackers had stolen funds from merchants' Lightning [nodes](https://iq.wiki/wiki/node) through a flaw first surfaced in an AI-assisted audit, and on August 27, 2026, Core Lightning's developers issued an emergency warning after AI-generated bug reports turned up real vulnerabilities.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Commentators distinguished such software-level vulnerabilities—including a [Safe](https://iq.wiki/wiki/safe) Wallet exploit tied to [Aave](https://iq.wiki/wiki/aave)'s FlashloanAdapter—from a break of ECDSA itself, which none of these incidents represented.[[8]](#cite-id-rpt543o1hn)\n\n## Reception and Expert Response\n\nReaction within the industry was sharply divided between those who treated the warning as a reasonable precaution and those who considered it alarmist. [Vitalik Buterin](https://iq.wiki/wiki/vitalik-buterin) agreed the AI risk is real but counseled against haste, writing on October 7, 2026, \"I don't recommend anyone scramble to move their funds to new wallets today. But we should take the risks to cryptography from AI-accelerated math seriously, and minimize our exposure to not just quantum-vulnerable cryptography, but also potentially AI-vulnerable cryptography.\"[[3]](#cite-id-6btkz6jr9d) He supported keeping funds, where practical, in addresses that have never signed a transaction, but warned against rushed migrations with a personal admission: \"I personally have lost more money in botched migrations than I have lost in all hacks combined.\"[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf)\n\nButerin also broadened the technical concern beyond elliptic curves. He named ML-DSA, fully homomorphic encryption, and lattices as the \"core new area of risk\" from AI-accelerated mathematics, writing that \"There is a good chance that the concrete security of lattices will take serious hits from the next two years of AI math,\" and elaborating that if AI delivers \"50 years of math in 2 years,\" that could plausibly include a \"naive factoring -> GNFS\" level of improvement in the ability to break lattices.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf)[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) He drew an analogy to how factoring, which naively takes 2^(n/2) time, was improved over decades to the general number field sieve at 2^O(n^(1/3)), and suggested similar unexpected improvements could exist for lattices and curves; for long-term security he suggested one reasonable action is to multiply key sizes by ten.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) For multisig wallets he advised doing confirmations off-chain so that signer signatures are not exposed on-chain, noting that if ECDSA broke quickly such a wallet would degrade to a single signer controlled by whoever gathered the signatures—preferable, he said, to everyone being able to take the funds.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)\n\nAmong other responses, Dragonfly's [Haseeb Qureshi](https://iq.wiki/wiki/haseeb-qureshi) called Drake's post \"a sober call,\" adding that \"the risk is not quantum, but just conventional mathematics overturning unproven cryptographic hardness assumptions.\"[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b) Critics were more pointed. Yehuda Lindell, [Coinbase](https://iq.wiki/wiki/coinbase)'s head of cryptography, called the post \"a really bad take,\" saying there is no evidence of a break in decades-old hardness assumptions such as elliptic-curve cryptography.[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b) Ledger chief technology officer [Charles Guillemet](https://iq.wiki/wiki/charles-guillemet) said that avoiding address reuse is reasonable for large holders but warned that a mass migration could create operational mistakes that lose funds with a higher probability than the risk being mitigated—a view [The Defiant](https://iq.wiki/wiki/the-defiant) reported as a pushback that a mass migration could cause \"costly mistakes.\"[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b)[[9]](#cite-id-ukcjq37ljb) Blockworks observed that if followed literally, Drake's guidance \"would render general crypto applications largely unusable to the mainstream public in current form,\" and framed the asserted risk as a reason for diversification, noting that traditional assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, and physical gold would be unaffected by a break in these cryptographic assumptions.[[2]](#cite-id-wqoqxqgu9b)\n\n## Ethereum's Post-Quantum Response\n\nDrake tied bunker mode to a longer-term technical transition that he said he would push to accelerate, describing a goal of \"maximum defensive acceleration\" of [Ethereum](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum)'s roadmap toward hash-based cryptography.[[10]](#cite-id-cn4xxw7p9a) His personal preference is to go \"all-in on hash-based cryptography\" and to avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely—whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies—proposing instead a single battle-tested hash from a family such as SHA or BLAKE as a basis for plausible post-AI security.[[10]](#cite-id-cn4xxw7p9a)[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) He pointed to Ethereum's draft roadmap, which he said \"fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification\" as a response to the quantum threat, and argued those timelines must be revisited and accelerated in light of what he called mathematical superintelligence.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)\n\nThe Ethereum [Foundation](https://iq.wiki/wiki/foundation) formed a dedicated post-quantum team earlier in 2026, with work underway on hash-based signatures, account abstraction, and replacements for other cryptographic systems vulnerable to quantum computers.[[8]](#cite-id-rpt543o1hn)[[5]](#cite-id-uyp0jxv53y) In March 2026 the Foundation unveiled a roadmap to protect the network from quantum computers, with core post-quantum infrastructure targeted for completion by 2029—a date [CoinDesk](https://iq.wiki/wiki/coindesk) reported more specifically as December 2029—though the roadmap remains subject to change.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) In June 2026, [Nicolas Consigny](https://iq.wiki/wiki/nicolas-consigny), lead of the Foundation's [Kohaku](https://iq.wiki/wiki/kohaku) project, proposed a SPHINCS post-quantum account protection scheme that does not require a [hard fork](https://iq.wiki/wiki/hard-fork).[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) Buterin noted that Lean Ethereum has moved in a \"hash-only\" direction over the past year and that its signatures are all hash-based, using either WOTS or SPHINCS.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)\n\nButerin tempered the hash-based enthusiasm with a technical caution. While he sees fewer openings for unexpected shortcuts in hash-based designs, he acknowledged they could also face attacks, and he observed that public-key encryption cannot be built from hashes alone: long-standing mathematical theorems require a trapdoor object with structure—group theory, isogenies, lattices, or code-based constructions—and anything with structure, he warned, should be assumed vulnerable to AI progress.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf)[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4) Some quantum-resistant designs rely on lattice-based cryptography, the approach underlying a digital-signature standard approved by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, but Ethereum's proposed long-term rebuild increasingly favors hash-based signatures.[[1]](#cite-id-2uryh766pf) Current Ethereum guidance continues to state that quantum computers cannot break the network's cryptography today and that users do not need to take action.[[4]](#cite-id-670a5quehr) Drake planned to address institutions on the subject at a live Q&A hosted on the [Ethereum Institutional](https://iq.wiki/wiki/ethereum-institutional) forum in London in November 2026.[[6]](#cite-id-nixu2bdso4)","categories":[{"id":"glossary","title":"glossary"}],"tags":[],"images":[{"id":"QmRDpNmPYZA2LN3vf1snC3c5BfPfqY6S6D2ixFuiJ2bkbK","type":"image/jpeg, image/png"}],"media":[],"metadata":[{"id":"website","value":"https://www.bunker-eth.com/"},{"id":"references","value":"[{\"id\":\"2uryh766pf\",\"url\":\"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/10/08/bitcoin-and-ether-holders-urged-to-prepare-bunker-mode-against-possible-ai-attacks\",\"description\":\"CoinDesk report on Drake's bunker-mode call\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"wqoqxqgu9b\",\"url\":\"https://blockworks.com/newsletter/0xresearch/issue/post_717c7b4e-c0e0-45ef-923f-286cae971ba5\",\"description\":\"Blockworks newsletter on bunker mode\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"6btkz6jr9d\",\"url\":\"https://protos.com/initiate-bunker-mode-to-protect-crypto-from-ai-says-justin-drake/\",\"description\":\"Protos coverage of viral bunker-mode post\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"670a5quehr\",\"url\":\"https://www.theblock.co/news/ecosystems/2026-10-07-ethereum-researcher-justin-drake-bunker-mode-planning-private-key-recovery-risk-417954\",\"description\":\"The Block defining Q-day\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"uyp0jxv53y\",\"url\":\"https://coindesk.cc/story/2026/10/bunker-mode-top-ethereum-researcher-sounds-alarm-over-ai-crypto-threat\",\"description\":\"CoinDesk AI Desk on classical algorithm risk\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"nixu2bdso4\",\"url\":\"https://forklog.com/en/justin-drake-says-ai-could-break-ecdsa-before-quantum-computers/\",\"description\":\"ForkLog quoting Drake's months-not-years warning\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"jwz9tlzii5\",\"url\":\"https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/ethereum-researcher-urges-crypto-bunker-mode-over-ecdsa-fears\",\"description\":\"CoinMarketCap on key rotation for oracles and councils\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"rpt543o1hn\",\"url\":\"https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/crypto/articles/crypto-bunker-mode-ethereum-justin-072614182.html\",\"description\":\"Yahoo Finance on custodians and key management\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"ukcjq37ljb\",\"url\":\"https://thedefiant.io/news/security/justin-drake-urges-bunker-mode-migration-to-fresh-crypto-addresses\",\"description\":\"The Defiant on Ledger CTO's pushback\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963},{\"id\":\"cn4xxw7p9a\",\"url\":\"https://newscord.org/article/justin-drake-urges-ethereum-and-bitcoin-holders-into-bunker-mode-against-ai-sign--Story_20261008_Bitcoinandetherholdebe4ced4a\",\"description\":\"NewsCord on maximum defensive acceleration\",\"timestamp\":1791509040963}]"},{"id":"main-image-origin","value":"{\"imageId\":\"QmRDpNmPYZA2LN3vf1snC3c5BfPfqY6S6D2ixFuiJ2bkbK\",\"originalId\":\"QmRDpNmPYZA2LN3vf1snC3c5BfPfqY6S6D2ixFuiJ2bkbK\"}"},{"id":"commit-message","value":"Create Crypto Bunker Mode wiki"}],"events":[{"type":"DEFAULT","title":"Justin Drake calls for 'bunker mode' planning","date":"2026-10-01","description":"Ethereum researcher Justin Drake publicly urged the community to adopt 'bunker mode' planning for private-key recovery risk.","link":null,"multiDateStart":null,"multiDateEnd":null,"id":"f56ddaa6-f0d3-44d8-a543-afd5c25fe870"},{"type":"DEFAULT","title":"Widespread media coverage of 'bunker mode' proposal","date":"2026-10-01","description":"Multiple cryptocurrency news outlets published coverage and analysis of the 'bunker mode' proposal.","link":null,"multiDateStart":null,"multiDateEnd":null,"id":"cf61eb15-a45c-4c7e-89c3-b02cbf5fa0d7"}],"linkedWikis":{"founders":[],"blockchains":[],"speakers":[]},"user":{"id":"0x8af7a19a26d8fbc48defb35aefb15ec8c407f889"},"author":{"id":"0x1E23b34d3106F0C1c74D17f2Cd0F65cdb039b138"},"language":"en","operator":{"id":"0x1E23b34d3106F0C1c74D17f2Cd0F65cdb039b138"}}